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When faced with a choice between two products, one of which is free, people overreact 
to the free product with demand exceeding what standard cost-benefit analysis predicts. 
One possible explanation for this result is affect. Free goods elicit affect which can 
trigger an automatic cognitive process that favors their selection. Response latency was 
selected as an implicit measure of attitude to assess if information processing is 
facilitated by a free product. Faster response times would suggest information 
processing was facilitated. The evidence from the response latency analysis was mixed 
and did not lead to a clear conclusion. 
 
[Portuguese]  
Quando confrontados com uma escolha entre dois produtos, um dos quais grátis, os 
indivíduos reagem de forma exagerada ao grátis com uma procura superior à que seria 
de esperar de uma análise custo-benefício. Uma possível explicação para este resultado 
é o afeto. Bens grátis incitam afeto que pode desencadear um processo cognitivo 
automático que favorece a sua selecção. A latência de resposta foi escolhida como uma 
medida implícita de atitude para avaliar se o processamento de informação é facilitado 
por um produto gratuito. Tempos de resposta mais rápidos sugeririam que o 
processamento de informação é facilitado. A evidência da análise de latência de 
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Intuition and anecdotal evidence suggest that in some sense, people value free products 
too much. Usually, the demand at a price of zero is many times higher than the demand 
at a very low price. Our goal is to examine the validity of this intuition and to establish 
the causes of the phenomenon. 
At first glance, it might not be surprising that the demand for a good is very high when 
the price is zero, but the extent of the effect is too large to be explained by this simple 
economic argument.  
In the paper that inspired this research, Shampanier et al (2007) examined the impact of 
“zero prices” on consumers’ choice. In one of their experiments, participants were 
offered a choice between a cheaper lower quality chocolate (Hershey’s) and a more 
expensive higher quality one (Ferrero Rocher). The prices of the chocolates were 
manipulated between subjects in the following manner: $0.02 and $0.27; $0.01 and 
$0.26; and zero and $0.25. Results showed that while there was roughly an even-split 
between the two chocolates in the first two conditions, 90% chose Hershey’s when it 
was free, indicating a discontinuity in the cost-benefit evaluations. In other words, 
consumers over-reacted to the free chocolate. 
Our experimental study had the purpose of bringing additional evidence about this 
subject by running a similar experiment. However, the conducted experiment had three 
additional features: response latency was measured between the exposure to the options 
and the moment one was selected; subjects chose chocolates sequentially under each 
condition and the study was complemented with a questionnaire.  
Previous research points to affect as a key element in the explanation for the 
attractiveness of free.  Response latency was selected as an implicit measure of attitude 
to assess whether information processing is facilitated (i.e., shorter latencies) or 
hindered (i.e., longer latencies) by the presentation of the attitude object, (i.e., the free 
product). If affect accounts for the over-reaction to free products, then we should have 
shorter latencies when subjects face free products.  
Sequentially exposing subjects to both conditions in a random order allows, for 
instance, the assessment of the impact of the conditions’ order on choice consistency or 
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response latency. This information complemented with the self-reported preferences 




2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Zero as a Special Price 
 
The objective of this chapter is to analyze and offer a critical assessment of previous 
work that is relevant to a better understanding of the over-reaction to free products and 
of its possible causes. 
We are going to start with the contributions from Prospect theory applied to choices 
from binary sets. Prospect theory is a general framework for understanding cognitive 
biases and is the foundation for the effects we are going to discuss within this chapter. 
We will present some evidence from previous studies on the importance of context and 
the impact a reference point can have on a buying decision. After presenting the concept 
of Distinction Bias and the Principle of Diminishing Sensitivity, it will be shown that 
zero is a special case that prevents consumers from using relative comparisons when 











Figure 1 - Context and reference point effects in choices from binary sets 
 
After that we will review the literature on the probable causes for the over-reaction to 
free products. We discuss the social norms and the mapping difficulty explanations. 
However, the previous evidence points to affect as a key element in the explanation. 
Subsequently, we are going to propose two potential mechanisms related to affect for 
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free products. One is related to the possibility that a free product may be able to reduce 
to zero the perceived risk of buyer's remorse (Zero-risk Bias). The other is associated 












Figure 2 – Possible causes for the over-reaction to free products 
 
 
Afterwards, we are going to explore contemporary theoretical developments related to 
attitudes, automatic cognitive processes and the specific consequences of affect on 
consumer behavior. Implicit and explicit measurements of attitudes will be discussed 
with an emphasis on the advantages of giving priority to an implicit measurement such 
as response latency. It will be shown that response latency analysis is a powerful tool 
for studying automatic processes in judgment and choice. Since an explicit 
measurement will complement our study, we will explain why Likert scales are the best 
approach.  
Finally, we discuss the context where subjects choose chocolates sequentially under 
both conditions. We will review the literature on consumers’ sequential decisions 




2.2. Prospect theory 
 
One of the lasting contributions of behavioral economics is the availability of a rich set 
of competing models of behavior in many settings, with Expected Utility theory and 
Prospect theory as the two front runners for choices under uncertainty. 
Prospect theory originated in the works of cognitive psychologists Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) who argue that decisions always conform to the conventional economic 
concept of “rational” from expected utility theory. It is a general framework for 
understanding cognitive biases. The model tries to simulate real-life choices, rather than 
optimal decisions. It describes how people make choices in situations where they have 
to decide between alternatives that involve risk. According to Prospect theory, such 
decision processes consist of two stages: editing and evaluation. In the first stage, 
possible outcomes of the decision are ordered following some heuristic. In particular, 
people decide which outcomes they see as basically identical and they set a reference 
point and consider lower outcomes as losses and larger as gains. In the evaluation 
phase, people behave as if they would compute a value (utility), based on the potential 
outcomes and their respective probabilities, and then choose the alternative having a 
higher utility. 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky found inconsistencies with the assumption of 
rationality that can be categorized into problems of: 
 (a) Framing – people sometimes make different choices when the same problem is 
presented in different ways. For example, if an unusual disease is expected to kill 600 
people next year, research has shown investing in a program that “will save 200 people” 
has more appeal than one in which “400 people will die,” in spite of both programs 
ultimately aiming  at the same goal (Tversky & Kahneman 1981). 
(b) Nonlinear preferences – people make choices inconsistent with the assumptions 
about preference functions. If A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then when 
people choose C over A, they are not behaving in agreement with economic rationality, 
particularly, preference transitivity. 
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(c) Risk aversion and risk seeking – some individuals will simultaneously and 
knowingly take unfair bets to avoid risk (e.g., by buying life insurance) and unfair bets 
that increase risk (e.g., playing slot machines). 
(d)   Source – the mechanism may matter even if the probable outcomes of activities are 
identical. People may pay more for a good because of the way it is packaged than they 
will for an identical item that is packaged differently, even if they intend to immediately 
discard the packaging. 
(e) Loss aversion – potential losses loom greater than relatively equal potential gains.  
The observed asymmetry in these differences is far too large to be explained solely by 
income effects. 
 
2.3. Context and reference point 
 
Some research in behavioral economics has challenged the view that user preferences 
exist a priori and suggests that preferences are formed at the time of choice or 
evaluation and are influenced by the context (Bettman et al. 1998). An important 
context characteristic is whether a product is evaluated alone or in the presence of 
another alternative (Hsee & Leclerc 1998). The presence of another product provides a 
reference against which attributes of a focal product can be compared and can lead to 
what Hsee and Zhang (2004) called “distinction bias.” It is an explanation for 
differences in evaluations of options between joint evaluation mode and separate 
evaluation mode. It suggests that viewing options simultaneously makes them seem 
more dissimilar and makes even small differences between options salient.  
Let’s consider the example described in Palmeira (2011). When televisions are 
displayed next to each other on the sales floor, the difference in quality between two 
similar high-quality televisions may appear substantial. A consumer may pay a much 
higher price for the higher-quality television, even though the difference in quality is 
imperceptible when the televisions are viewed in isolation. The consumer will be 
watching only one television at a time, so the lower-cost television could have provided 
a similar experience at a lower cost. 
In some demonstrations of context effects, researchers contrast choices from binary sets 
with choices from extended sets, which include an additional option. It is shown that the 
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presence of this option increases the attractiveness of one of the original alternatives, as 
consumers use information from the entire set to make their decisions. The tendency to 
rely on contextual cues is so strong that effects have been shown even when the 
additional option is dominated (J. Huber & McCann 1982) or unavailable (Hedgcock et 
al. 2009; Simonson 1989). Research by Hsee and colleagues (Hsee 1996; Hsee & 
Leclerc 1998; Hsee & J. Zhang 2004) have shown that contextual influences can occur 
even in binary sets. Contrasting separate and joint evaluations, this line of research has 
shown that attribute values of an alternative are used as references in the judgment of 
the attractiveness of another alternative. For example, in one of his studies, Hsee (1996) 
showed that in separate evaluations, a dictionary with 10,000 entries in good condition 
is better evaluated than one with 20,000 entries, but with a torn cover. However, in a 
joint evaluation task, most people prefer the dictionary with 20,000 entries. Hsee 
reasoned that in separate evaluation it is hard to judge the number of entries in a 
dictionary. In this sense, participants are relatively insensitive to a difference between 
10,000 and 20,000 when only one of the dictionaries is presented.  
There is also evidence that consumers look to the price for cues to categorize contexts 
and use market norms when the price is non-zero, but revert to social norms when the 
price is zero (Heyman & Ariely 2004). This is an effect that is discussed later. 
 
2.3.1. Diminishing sensitivity 
 
The importance of reference points in judgment and decision making was also 
recognized in the extension of Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) to riskless 
choice. Reference-dependence is one of the fundamental principles of their proposed 
value function, which is also characterized by diminishing sensitivity. According to the 
principle of diminishing sensitivity (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahneman 
1992), the perceived difference between two quantities decreases as both quantities 
increase by the same amount. In other words, the difference between 10 and 20 is 
perceived as larger than the difference between 110 and 120, even though in both cases 
the difference is ten units. Values are not evaluated in isolation or as absolute 
differences. Rather, individuals focus on relative differences. Twenty is the double of 
10, or 100% more, whereas 120 is roughly 10% more than 110. This type of comparison 
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helps in providing meaning to absolute differences. For example, a shopping decision 
may be framed as a contrast between a 10% difference in price versus a 30% difference 
in quality, as opposed to an evaluation of the dollar difference in price compared to the 
absolute difference in quality.  
An interesting consequence of this principle is that consumers’ perceptions can be 
influenced by how one frames a difference between alternatives. For example, the 
sound quality of hi-fi systems can be expressed as audio signal delivery or as its 
complementary value, audio distortion. Wong and Kwong (2005) showed that in a 
choice task between two hi-fi systems, a difference in audio signal had a drastically 
stronger impact when it was described as audio distortion (0.003% vs. 0.01%) than 
when it was described as audio signal delivery (99.997% vs. 99.99%). Even though the 
absolute difference is the same in both cases (0.007%), consumers tend to be influenced 
by relative differences. In the former, consumers could interpret the difference not as 
0.007% but instead by noting that one’s quantity is roughly three times the other. On the 
other hand, in the latter, this type of interpretation leads consumers to conclude that the 
two quantities are roughly the same.  
 
2.3.2. Zero-comparison effect 
 
An important limitation of this type of comparison occurs when one of the attributes is 
zero. In relative terms, compared to zero, any number is infinitely larger; so this type of 
comparison becomes meaningless (Palmeira, 2010). Consumers lose the reference point 
that allows them to use relative comparisons between attributes and, as a result, they 
might focus on absolute differences instead. He termed this the “zero-comparison 
effect.” In several experiments, Palmeira (2010) arrived at an interesting and somewhat 
surprising conclusion. He found evidence that worsening a product by increasing the 
level of an undesirable attribute from zero can increase its attractiveness. For instance, 
participants were offered two hi-fi alternatives that differed only in terms of audio-
signal distortion. The sound quality of option A was the only factor manipulated 
between conditions, as 0.003% in the control condition and 0.000% in the zero-value 
condition. As A’s signal distortion improved from 0.003% to 0% its choice share 
dropped from 83% to 56%.  
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Being an undesirable attribute, price seems to perform differently from other 
undesirable attributes (Palmeira, 2010). If one was to apply the rationale from the 
described zero-comparison effect to price, he or she should have predicted the opposite 
of what Shampanier et al (2007) found. Taking the perspective that a small number 
provides a reference, whereas zero takes the reference away, consumers should consider 
Ferrero Rocher as extremely expensive, since it is being sold for more than ten times the 
price of Hershey’s and prefer the latter. Therefore, compared to the zero and 0.25 
condition, Hershey’s should get a greater choice share when it has a very small price 
than when it is free. This was clearly not the case. 
One cannot conclude that the zero-comparison effect does not exist when it comes to 
price. It is possible that this effect is present but there are other stronger opposing 
effects that are key factors in understanding the attractiveness of free products.  
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that although we referred to a switch from 
relative comparisons to absolute ones, no clear evidence was found in the literature for 
this shift. To better understand the zero-comparison effect, further investigation is 
necessary to support or challenge this claim. 
 
2.4. Social Norms 
 
As mentioned before, a possible mechanism that might explain the overemphasis on 
free options deals with the norms that might accompany free products. Free invokes 
norms of social exchange, whereas costly options invoke market exchange norms 
(McGraw & Tetlock 2005; Kim et al. 2009; Edelman 2009). In one study, Heyman and 
Ariely (2004) demonstrate that people are likely to exert more effort under a social 
exchange than when monetary amounts are mentioned. However, when the elements of 
both social exchanges and monetary exchanges are present, the results are very similar 
to those of a monetary exchange. It is highly unlikely that participants apply social 
exchange norms to one option in the choice set (free option) and monetary exchange 
norms to the other (cost option). Instead, participants most likely apply the same set of 
norms to all choices in the set, and thereby eliminate the effect of social exchange 
norms. 
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Shampanier et al (2007) further tested the social norms hypothesis by offering the low-
value chocolate for a small negative price ($−0.01), which creates a transaction with no 
financial cost, but still mentions money, and thus presumably does not invoke social 
exchange norms.  They conclude the effect is not due to social exchange norms, since 
demand in this condition is similar to that in the free condition. 
 
2.5. Mapping Difficulty  
 
Another possible mechanism underlining the zero-price effect comes from the fact that 
people have difficulty mapping the utility they expect to receive into monetary terms 
(Ariely et al. 2006; Hsee et al. 2003; Nunes & Park 2003). For instance, there is 
evidence that maximum willingness to pay is susceptible to anchoring with an 
obviously irrelevant number such as the last two digits of a social security number 
(Ariely et al. 2006). These results reinforce the importance of context and that people 
resort to the use of external cues to come up with their valuations. To the extent that 
evaluating the utility of a piece of chocolate in monetary terms is difficult, loss-averse 
consumers might resort to a strategy that assures them of some positive surplus.  As 
mentioned before about prospect theory, loss aversion refers to people's tendency to 
strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains. According to Shampanier et al 
(2007), the allure of free might be tied to this fear of loss. There is no clear possibility 
of loss when you choose a free item but there is a risk of having made a poor decision 
when you pay for that item. The zero-price effect might be attributed, according to this 
perspective, to the uncertainty surrounding the overall benefit associated with costly 
options and the contrasting certainty about overall benefits of free options. 
To test this hypothesis Shampanier et al (2007) ran an experiment where children were 
able to exchange chocolate for chocolate rather than for money. Presumably, chocolates 
can be mapped more naturally onto other chocolates. They concluded that the zero-price 
effect remains strong even when the trade-offs involve commensurate products, which 
reduces the strength of the mapping difficulty hypothesis. 
These results generalize Shampanier’s et al (2007) previous findings. Attractiveness of 
zero cost is not limited to monetary transactions; there seems to be a general increase in 
the attractiveness of those options that do not require giving up anything. The results 
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hold when the goods and exchange currency are commensurate. Another important 
result is that, although a 0.01 price is not common in the marketplace, trading candies is 
common between children and approximate a real-life situation, which adds ecological 
validity to the findings.  
Although these results challenge the mapping difficulty hypothesis, it does not exclude 




The role of affect in decision making is currently a major focus in decision research. A 
number of new lines of research have begun to draw attention to the important role of 
affect in judgment and choice (Knutson et al. 2007; Rick & Loewenstein 2007; Mellers 
et al. 1999; Shiv & Fedorikhin 1999; Loewenstein & Lerner 2003; Hermalin & Isen 
2008). Traditionally decision theory tended to focus on more cognitive types of errors - 
like the aforementioned distinction bias or diminishing sensitivity - as the main sources 
of sub-optimal decision making. Recent research is providing evidence for the idea that 
affect can distort decision making. The new research is also pointing to the conclusion 
that many biases that had earlier been viewed in cognitive terms may in fact reflect the 
influence of affective factors (Loewenstein et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2009). Parallel 
developments have been occurring in neuroscience, with that field showing signs of 
splitting into two subfields, one focusing on 'cognitive neuroscience' and the other on 
'affective neuroscience' (Damásio 2006; Panksepp 2004). 
A mechanism that might account for the zero-price effect is affect, such that options 
with no cost invoke a more positive affective response. Consumers might use this 
reaction as a decision-making cue opting for the free option. Previous research 
considers two basic components (Finucane et al. 2000; Slovic et al. 2007; Gourville & 
Soman 2005). The first is that free offers evoke a higher positive affect, and the second 
is that people use this affect as an input for their decision-making process. 
Shampanier et al (2007) finds evidence that the free good elicits a more positive affect 
than standard cost-benefit analysis predicts. One reason for this could be that the 
decision to take a free candy is a much simpler decision, and that simplicity could be the 
driver of higher affect (Schwarz 2002; Diederich 2003). This topic shall be brought into 
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notice later in order to discuss the simplicity of the decision in more detail while 
discussing mental transaction costs. 
Alternatively, much like the disutility of paying while consuming (Prelec & 
Loewenstein 1998), it is possible that options that involve both benefits and costs create 
a negative impact on affect due to the simultaneity of these two components — whereas 
options that have only benefits do not include this penalty. 
In another experiment, Shampanier et al (2007) forced participants to engage in a 
cognitive and deliberate evaluation of the alternatives before they choose, and thereby 
make non-affective, more cognitive evaluations available and accessible to participants.  
They concluded that affect invoked by the free option drives the zero-price effect, but 
when people have access to available cognitive inputs, they base their decisions on 
those, and the benefit of zero largely dissipates. 
This explanation is sound but does not address what might cause this affect for free 
products in the first place. We are going to propose two potential explanations. One is 
related to the possibility that a free product may be able to reduce to zero the perceived 
risk of buyer's remorse. The other is rooted in the fact that people are always looking for 
ways to economize on their mental effort. In other words, we may like free because it 
helps us think less.  
 
2.6.1. Heuristics and Zero-risk Bias 
 
Individuals operate within both mental and environmental constraints. These include 
their limited cognitive resources, the information they have, or the finite amount of time 
available to make decisions (Baayen & Milin 2010). Therefore, decisions are merely 
bounded rational. Instead of a rigid rule of optimization, people commonly use 
heuristics to make decisions which ease the effort associated with the decision-making 
process. In everyday conversations, people often refer to heuristics as an “educated 
guess,” a “mental shortcut,” or a “rule of thumb.”According to Simon (1990), as cited in 
Shah and Oppenheimer (2008), heuristics are “methods for arriving at satisfactory 
solutions with modest amounts of computation.” 
While often useful and convenient in everyday life, the use of heuristics means 
decisions are likely to be grounded on an incomplete appreciation of information and to 
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be influenced by extraneous factors. This might lead to anomalous and contradictory 
behavior under the effect of cognitive biases (Baayen & Milin, 2010). On the other 
hand, some research (Todd & Gigerenzer 2003) suggests that, with experience, people 
become well equipped to identify redundant information and to make accurate 
judgments from only small amounts of information. These ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics 
may be just as effective as complex forms of thinking (Gigerenzer 2004). The 
discussion continues between those who emphasize the repeated success of heuristics in 
generating sensible decisions and those who stress cognitive errors occasionally 
produced by heuristics. 
Experience and feedback will usually result in the abandonment of grossly inaccurate 
heuristics. However, it cannot be assumed that inaccurate judgments will be recognized 
or individuals will have sufficient insight into their own thinking to recognize the 
underlying cognitive mechanisms and how they need to be changed (Baayen & Milin, 
2010).  
The propensity to use heuristics depends on the type of attributes and the difficulty of 
measurement. For instance, decision making is more heuristic in situations that involve 
spending time rather than money because, compared to monetary expenditures, 
temporal expenditures are harder to account for (Saini & Monga 2008).  
Some heuristics are based on attempts to recognize relationships between variables. In 
fact, they seem to work by an unconscious process called attribute substitution 
(Kahneman & Frederick 2002). Attribute Substitution theory suggests that when 
individuals have to make a judgment of a target attribute that is computationally 
complex or relatively inaccessible, they are likely to substitute it with a more easily 
calculated or accessible heuristic attribute. For instance, people may assume a 
relationship between price and quality, using one to predict the other (Völckner & 
Hofmann 2007). Even when the relevant uncertainty has been removed (i.e. post-tasting 
the products), studies have found that prices affect subjective quality evaluations of 
foods (Heffetz & Shaya 2009) and wines (Almenberg & Dreber 2010). 
In the case of free products, it is possible that a heuristic might be linked with the zero-
risk bias (Wakker et al. 1997; Kahneman & Tversky 1979).  There is evidence that 
individuals prefer small benefits that are certain to large ones that are uncertain. This 
occurs when individuals value complete elimination of a risk, however small, to a 
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reduction in a greater risk. Individuals might assume that free products (zero-price) 
reduce to zero the probability of buyer's remorse (zero-risk). Zero-risk bias is one 
possible mechanism behind affect for zero-price. This zero-risk is a type of “nothing to 
lose” rationalization that may easily become a rule of thumb to apply when the 
individual is facing any zero-price offer. This is consistent with the view that zero prices 
create an environment of low risk experimentation and progress for consumers (Hippel 
2001). 
 
2.6.2. Mental Transaction Costs 
 
Mental accounting is the set of cognitive operations used by individuals and households 
to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities (Thaler 1995, 2004, 2008; 
Rajagopal & Rha 2009). Mental accounting procedures are those heuristics that have 
evolved to economize on time and thinking costs. 
Mental transaction costs are the costs the buyer faces trying to estimate the desirability 
of the transaction (Szabo 1999; Kivetz 1999). This involves estimation such as the 
characteristics of the subject of the transaction, the uncertain future cash-flows and the 
actual inconvenience of having to make the decision. The effort required to process 
complex information may be regarded as a transaction cost and, like other costs, tends 
to keep people away from making purchase decisions. People tend to be cognitive 
misers (Garbarino & Edell 1997; Swait & Adamowicz 2001; Bettman et al. 1998). They 
will not waste effort thinking about something they consider not to warrant it and will 
be looking for ways to economize on their mental effort. It would be enormously taxing 
on individuals to attend to all information in the world with a high degree of analysis. 
As a result, people aim to expend the minimum amount of cognitive resources.  
Szabo (1999) extended transaction costs to purchasing decisions. Mental transaction 
costs associated with the evaluation of a purchasing decision create a minimum level of 
inconvenience that cannot be removed simply by lowering the price of goods. Szabo 
(1999) looked at the idea of micropayments, a system that would allow you to pay 
fractions of a cent per Web page you read, for example. These business models are 
destined to fail, Szabo concluded, because although they minimize the economic costs 
of choices, they still have all the cognitive costs. As Odlyzko (2001) has pointed out, 
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consumers prefer flat-rate pricing from internet providers even though it costs them 
more because they eliminate this kind of cognitive costs. Furthermore, there is 
additional evidence of the impact of mental transaction costs from road pricing based on 
highway tolls (Levinson 2010). 
Using the same reasoning, zero-price can have a significant impact on mental 
transaction costs (Anderson 2009; Anderson 2008; Pauwels & Weiss 2008). If we 
consider an individual offer of a free chocolate then we should expect a lower mental 
transaction cost compared with a non-zero priced offer. People, in this case, have one 
less computation because they do not have to answer the “Is it worth it?” question.  
People can use something like a “nothing to lose” heuristic and the decision to accept 
the offer gets easier.  
We should note that there are other mental transaction costs to free products. People 
worry if it is really free or fear negative consequences for their social image by possibly 
being seen as a miser. They also weigh nonmonetary costs and externalities like, for 
instance, considering the environmental impact of a free newspaper (Anderson 2009). 
The following diagram illustrates the two possible non-mutually exclusive causes for 











Figure 3 - Reasons for affect for zero-price 
 
 
Consumers may consider free product as a way to reduce to zero the probability of 
buyer's remorse making zero-risk bias one underlying mechanism that leads to affect. 
The other cause might be the fact that people are looking for ways to economize on 
their mental effort. The association of free products and reduced mental transaction 
costs can lead to affect for zero-price. 
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2.6.3. Automatic Cognitive Process 
 
 
An attitude is a hypothetical construct that represents an individual's degree of like or 
dislike for something. Attitudes are generally positive or negative judgments of an 
attitude object such as a person, place or event. Most attitudes are the result of either 
direct experience or observational learning from the environment (Coaley 2010) . 
Automatic cognitive process appears as one general concept comprising all processes 
that, once started, do not need conscious monitoring as they run by themselves (Bargh 
& Chartrand 2000). They are characterized by implicitness, spontaneity, rapidity, 
efficiency and inevitability in the presence of triggering cues (Moors & De Houwer 
2006). 
Consumer contexts are conducive to automatic processing effects related to attitudes 
and there is evidence that a considerable amount of processing occurs in this 
unconscious manner (Dehaene et al. 2001). Fitzsimons et al. (2002) reviewed evidence 
for the role of non-conscious influences on consumer responses including affect and 
choice. Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) further argued for the role of the unconscious in the 
routine behavior of consumers and proposed that much of it involves automatic goal 
pursuit. The activation of that goal to act automatically evokes that specific behavior, 
labeled “habitual.” Conceptual accounts emphasizing conscious and careful information 
processing are unable to account for a large part of consumer choices. Instead, countless 
decisions are contextually or environmentally cue-induced and they either engage 
automatically activated attitudes or are completely devoid of deliberate attitude 
processing (Dijksterhuis et al. 2006).  
In current marketplace interactions, consumers’ familiarity with brands, stores and 
products makes automatic processing very likely to occur in daily problem solving. This 
automatic processing also applies to the common repeat purchases of products with 
which consumers are involved (Hoyer 1984).  
Since affect is one of the main causes presented for the attractiveness of free, we are 
going to concentrate on this kind of consumer response. For example, theories of 
category-based affect suggest that affective responses to stimuli can be a direct, 
automatic consequence of the act of categorization (Fiske 1982). When the category is 
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accessed, so too is the related affect which is then transferred automatically to the 
stimulus. For strong attitudes, the mere perception of the attitude object is often enough 
to automatically activate the attitude. Work on mere exposure effects (Zajonc 1968, 
2001) also suggests that evaluations can be based upon implicit memory for stimuli, 
again leading to evaluations that occur non-consciously. Other researchers have focused 
on the degree to which attitude constructs can operate non-consciously or implicitly to 
impact behaviors in ways not recognized by conscious processing (Greenwald & Banaji 
1995). 
Finally, research in the ‘‘affect as information’’ stream has suggested that mood can 
impact judgments (Clore et al. 1994), at least when mood effects are not made salient, 
and thus are more likely to occur in an automatic, non-conscious fashion. 
 
 
2.6.4. Implicit and explicit measures of attitudes 
 
There is one attitude construct. Implicit and explicit measures are just different ways of 
measuring the same thing (Fazio & Olson 2003). Dual process theorists, e.g., within the 
MODE model (Fazio 1990) and the heuristic-systematic model (Chen & Chaiken 1999), 
agree that attitudes are produced jointly as a function of deliberate and spontaneous 
processing. Explicit attitudes are thought to measure deliberate processing and implicit 
attitudes are thought to measure spontaneous processing.  
Explicit measures of attitudes rely on individuals' self-reported assessments of the 
specific attributes or their intentions regarding potential behaviors and choices they 
face. Responses are often registered on scales to express the degree to which the 
subjects possess an attribute or plan to engage in a particular behavior (Coaley 2010). 
This approach assumes that individuals have conscious access to the relevant constructs 
in memory. Oskamp & Schultz (2005) review several widely acknowledged problems 
with explicit measures. For instance, explicit measures may induce poor comprehension 
due to complex or unclear wording, perceived pressure to provide socially acceptable 
answers, misplaced propensity to indiscriminately agree to items regardless of content, 
or extremity of response. Implicit measures are less exposed to such methodological 
shortcomings. 
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Implicit measures hold the advantage that individuals may not realize what is being 
measured and may not be able to consciously correct their answers within the allotted 
time constraints (De Houwer et al. 2009, 2010). Automatic processing occurs in the 
absence of particular processing goals on the part of the individual or operates even 
when the person is unaware of the object prompting the process. In spite of the 
divergence in framework, there is evidence that implicit and explicit methods in a 
consumption context are reasonably well aligned and correlate highly (Dimofte 2010).  
This study was based on an implicit measure - response latency - but it was 
complemented with some explicit measurements. The objective was to bring to light 
other possible effects and to make sure that what we intended to implicitly measure was 
not being influenced by other relevant factors. A possible correlation with the variables 
collected from the actual experiment – choice, inconsistency, response latency, etc. – 
can give more clues to better understand the subject. 
 
2.6.5. Response Latency 
 
Implicit measures of attitudes are often structured to assess whether information 
processing is facilitated (i.e., shorter latencies) or hindered (i.e., longer latencies) by the 
presentation of an attitude object (Gawronski & Bodenhausen 2007). Facilitation (or 
impairment) reflects the compatibility (or confliction) between the process engaged by 
the activation of the attitude and some other processing demand.  
One of the most powerful and useful tools for studying automatic processes in judgment 
and choice is response-latency analysis. This approach has been used to measure 
judgment strength (Houston & Fazio 1989), measure automatic judgment activation  
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, et al. 1986), and to distinguish between ‘‘real’’ previously-
formed judgments stored in memory versus ‘‘artificial’’ measurement-induced or 
constructed judgments  (Fazio, Lenn, et al. 1984). Response-latency measures are 
superior to other measures in many respects. They are less reactive, less obtrusive, less 
susceptible to demand effects, and they also better predict persistence and resistance 
(Bassili 1996). 
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The automatic nature of the activation and processing makes respondents’ control over 
their immediate evaluations almost impossible (Powell & Fazio 1984). In addition, 
research on attitude accessibility has demonstrated that strong attitudes speed up 











Figure 4 - Relationship between attitudes, affect and response speed 
 
 
Considering the evidence from the automatic cognitive processes described, if affect 
accounts for the over-reaction to free products, then we should have shorter latencies 
when subjects are confronted with free products. Furthermore, faster responses would 
also be consistent with lower mental transaction costs. When offered something free, 
people would not have to answer the “Is it worth it” question and might activate a 
“nothing to lose” heuristic sparing mental effort.  
This leads us to our main hypotheses: 
 




2.6.6. Self-reported preferences 
 
This study was complemented with some explicit measurements. Various kinds of 
rating scales have been developed to measure attitudes directly.  The most widely used 
is the Likert Scale. 
Likert (1932) developed the principle of measuring attitudes by asking people to 
respond to a series of statements about a topic, in terms of the extent to which they 
agree with them, therefore giving insight into the cognitive and affective components of 
attitudes. 
 
2.7. Variety seeking or consistency seeking 
 
Shampanier’s et al (2007) study is based on an aggregate level analysis. If we were to 
sequentially expose subjects to both conditions – free and standard – in a random order 
we could collect more information to help understand the allure of free. For instance, 
we could evaluate if the conditions’ order have an impact on choice consistency or 
response latency. 
Consumers making repeated selections among a set of options often need to decide 
whether to stick with a favorite or switch to something different. A key finding in 
previous research is that people are often motivated to choose variety (Ratner, Kahn, et 
al. 1999). Consumers often seek variety in order to manage the declining utility from 
recent consumption of similar items (Inman 2001; Fishbach et al. 2011), to meet 
internal needs for stimulation (Raju 1980) and to make an impression on others that 
they are interesting and unique rather than closed-minded or boring (Ariely & Levav 
2000; Ratner & Kahn 2002). 
Other researchers suggest that consumers are motivated to seek consistency and exhibit 
stable preferences. Behavioral consistency allows one to follow stable preferences and 
exhibit loyalty. In addition, individuals infer their own preferences by monitoring their 
own past behaviors and then choosing similar subsequent actions (Aronson 1997). 
Consumers sometimes desire to enact loyal behaviors toward brands that have 
performed well in the past (Oliver 1999) and such behavior is driven by an emotional 
connection to the brand or company (M. D. Johnson et al. 2006).  
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3. Methodology  
 
3.1. Experimental Method  
 
The use of experimental methods in economics is a relatively recent development. Peer 
reviewed articles using experimental methods were almost nonexistent until the mid-
1960s and surpassed 50 annually for the first time in 1982. By 1998, the number of 
experimental papers published per year exceeded 200 (Camerer & Loewenstein 2004).  
Lab experiments allow the investigator to influence the set of prices, budget sets, 
information sets, and actions available to actors, and thus measure the impact of these 
factors on behavior within the context of the laboratory. It provides ceteris paribus 
observations of individual economic agents, which are otherwise difficult to obtain 
(Levitt & List 2007). For the purpose of this study - causal inference - the controlled 
conditions of the laboratory provide the best possible environment in which to abstract 
from other potentially confounding factors. This is known as the internal validity of 
laboratory experimentation.  
Lab experiments can provide a crucial first understanding and suggest underlying 
mechanisms that might be at work when certain data patterns are observed. In this case, 
the observed data pattern is the demand at a price of zero that is many times higher than 
the demand at a very low price. This subject has been explored before using this 
methodology and we wanted to further investigate its causes. Unlike other subjects in 
economics, the data necessary to address these particular questions are not available in 
databases. Researchers have to use this type of methodology to get insights into the 
phenomenon.  
To test our hypothesis, we examined how much time subjects take to reach a decision 
and whether they chose a free product even when they must forgo an option that, 
according to expected utility theory, they should find preferable. We contrasted two 
choice situations that involve a constant difference between two products’ net benefits 
and used nonrandom aggregate preference inconsistency as a measure of over-reaction 
to the free product.  
A nonrandom aggregate preference inconsistency exists when a group is incoherent in 
their preferences in a similar explainable manner. This differs from preference 
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heterogeneity in which model parameters account for differences in preferences 
between groups or individuals. Usually a study compares the distribution of choices 
across different experiments that were run with different samples and check for 
consistency with the model (Fehr & Schmidt 2006). This happens when, for instance, 
different contexts or question phrasings of identical choice situations lead to different 
choices and different model parameter estimates. By contrast, within-subject tests 
analyze individual-level decisions obtained in different experiments with the same 
sample (Blanco et al. 2010). This analysis will also be present by the introduction of the 
second moment of the experiment. 
Studies show that judgments can change with mood, weather, and any number of 
random factors that a researcher cannot measure. The stochastic nature of preference in 
response to such modification is addressed in preference models by representing choice 
as a random variable (McCausland 2009). For instance, Random Utility theory includes 
a stochastic term allowing for random changes in preferences over repeated decisions. A 
significant finding is one that is evident even under the assumption of stochasticity in 
people’s choices. We term preference inconsistency of a stochastic nature random 
preference inconsistency because it is frequently represented as a random variable in 
models.  
In a similar setup as Shampanier’s et al (2007) experiment, all subjects must choose 
between two options: buy a low-value product (e.g., one undifferentiated chocolate we 
will name “Red”), or buy a higher-value product (e.g., one Ferrero Roche). The 
variation across conditions that enables us to measure their reaction to the price of zero 
relies on two basic conditions: “standard” and “free.” In the standard condition, the 
prices of both products are positive — Red costs € 0,05 and Ferrero Roche costs €  0,10. 
In the free condition, both prices are reduced by the same amount, so that the cheaper 
good becomes free - Red is free and the Ferrero is € 0,05. 
In our free conditions, the cheaper product always weakly dominates a possible buying 
nothing alternative, because they share the same cost (zero) and clearly differ in their 
benefits (J. Huber & McCann 1982). In the cost conditions, no such asymmetric 
dominance relationship exists. We decided to exclude the “buying nothing” option to 





The experiment was conducted in November in two subsequent sessions at different 
Oporto University campuses with 150 students from two areas of knowledge: 
Humanities (n1=76) and Engineering (n2=74). The samples were drawn from the 
population of undergraduates and a member of each sample participated in only one 
session.  
We recruited volunteers as participants in the experiment and not students from the 
researchers’ own course, other courses in the department or even in the same campus. 
We were concerned with inducing demand effects in students knowledgeable of the 
theories we were trying to test. Moreover, we were looking for “true” volunteers and 
not “pretend” volunteers who are students in a class that feel compelled to participate 
and would decline to do so outside this context. Recruiting participants from across the 
university is a relatively painless way to avoid selection biases. 
A final issue in the subject-pool concerns the use of students instead of the general 
population. In terms of economics experiments that test theories, this is not a 
problematic criticism – the economic theory is supposed to be general and to apply to 
anyone facing a decision-making process like the one described in the theory. 
The day before the experiment, an email was sent to the student population inviting 
them to “participate in a scientific study about decision making.” We decided to keep 
details to a minimum in order to curtail any possible self-selection bias. In addition, we 
did not want to use any kind of deception just to attract more subjects. One of the 
general accepted rules in experimental economics is that the researcher must not deceive 
their participants. This prohibition on deception includes deception about the purpose of 
the experiment, the payoff the participants will earn, or the characterization of the 
participants’ counterparts. The validity of an economic experiment rests on the link 
between behavior and incentives. If that link is weakened, the experiment becomes an 
inferior test of the economic theory it is designed to address. If participants are deceived 
about that link, the validity of their decisions is called into doubt. A second reason 
deception is disfavored has to do with the public-goods nature of trust in the 
experimenter. If participants are routinely deceived in experiments, they will begin to 
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distrust the experimenter’s statements. This lack of trust could lead the participants to 




A booth in a classroom contained two upside-down cardboard boxes, one for each 
condition – free or standard. Below each of these boxes were two glass containers half-
full of chocolates with a large label indicating the price. In the case of the zero price, the 
label indicated “grátis” – “free” in Portuguese. 
Before entering the room, the participants were briefed with minimal context. We chose 
this for three reasons. First, as discussed before, context can add systematic bias or 
demand effects. For example, if participants in aggregate think they should select food 
from well-known brands for safety reasons then describing (framing) the decision in 
terms of choosing between a well-known and a unknown brand might increase the 
likelihood of choosing the former rather than the latter. This would change the 
responses in a systematic way. Second, context often adds variance to the data. This 
additional noise might not change the average or aggregate decision, but it can impact 
the variance of those decisions, reducing the likelihood of detecting statistically 
significant differences between treatments of the experiment. Finally, the theory being 
developed is supposed to apply generally, so those experiments should not rely on a 
particular context.  
The standard text for the briefing outside the classroom was the following: 
 
“This is a simulation of a real buying situation where you must choose between two 
objects with different prices. You can quit at any time without paying anything. The 
whole procedure will take 5 to 10 minutes. The experiment will be videotaped for 
academic purposes and ultimately deleted. It will not be viewed by anyone besides the 
conductors of the experiment.  Do you want to proceed?” 
 
We were aware of the likely impact of the Hawthorne effect amplified by the presence 
of the camcorder. This difficulty was weighted against the bias introduced in the 
reaction time by the presence of someone with a stopwatch in the room and the 
 30
difficulty of accurately and consistently measuring time on-the-fly without the 
advantage given by a replay. We believe this deferred data collection setup was the 
superior one between the only two options we regarded as ethical.  
The camcorder was positioned at 2.5 meters in height and behind the subject to 
minimize intrusiveness and aimed at the cardboard boxes giving the option of avoiding 
having one’s face filmed if he/she didn’t deliberately face the camera. 
When the subject entered the classroom, he/she was assigned to one of the conditions 
(free or standard) based on a randomly generated order prepared beforehand. 
Afterwards, more information was given by the researcher:  
 
“Below this box are two items with a price. After I remove the box you can choose one 
of the items. If you choose the most expensive item of each box you will pay 15 cents. 
This is the maximum amount you can spend. After I remove the box you must decide and 
pick up the one you choose. You cannot ask questions during the experiment. Do you 
have any questions now? Do you want to proceed?” 
 
Since one of the variables was the speed of the decision, we wanted to minimize the 
temptation to interact with the researcher when the clock was ticking. When the 
researcher exposed the chocolates, he faced sideways to discourage any questions. This 
was critical because we wanted to measure the lapsed time between the instant the 
chocolates were exposed and the moment the subject picked one of them.  
After the subject had selected his chocolate, the first moment of the experiment ended.  























Figure 5 - Sequential steps in the methodology 
 
 
During the experiment there was a frequent re-supply of chocolates in order to maintain 
the half-full condition and the balance between the glass containers. The goal is to 
prevent inference by the subject - based on the unevenness between the containers - on 
the choices of previous subjects and to make the conditions as similar as possible for 
each participant. 
 
3.4. Revealed Preferences 
 
Economic theories describe and predict decisions individuals will make in the presence 
of payoffs. It is critical for theory testing that the participants actually face the payoffs 
assumed by the theory. The fact that individuals cooperate in social dilemmas when 
there are no payoff consequences from their actions is simply not informative. 
Economic theory makes no predictions of what individuals will say they would do and 
only states what they will do when faced with a given decision and the resulting 
payoffs. The hypothetical bias is well documented (Hensher 2010) and would almost 
certainly have an effect not only on the choices but on the reaction time. Therefore, we 
could not tell people that they weren’t going to pay. We wanted to make sure that 
people understood this is not a hypothetical purchase but a real one and that the cost of 
the goods would be very small. We didn’t want people to feel any kind of deception. 
After the participants had chosen the chocolates we had the option to refuse the 
payment and offer the selected chocolates as a gift since the variables had already been 
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captured. We felt that this behavior would confuse the participants and seem suspicious 
because just seconds before we insisted it wasn’t hypothetical, and that they would have 
to pay. Therefore, in the name of congruence, we received the payment from the 
participants. 
After the payment each participant was asked to complete a one-page questionnaire 
(appendix). As mentioned before, Likert-type scales use fixed choice response formats 
and are designed to measure attitudes or opinions. These ordinal scales measure levels 
of agreement or disagreement. A Likert-type scale assumes that the strength/intensity of 
experience is linear, i.e. on a continuum from strongly agree to strongly disagree, and 
makes the assumption that attitudes can be measured (Oppenheim 1998). Respondents 
may be offered a choice of five to seven or even nine pre-coded responses with the 
neutral point being neither agree nor disagree. Subjects were asked to rate on a Likert 
scale their liking for chocolate and for bonbons. If the subjects responded positively, the 
perceived applicability of the affirmation “I like chocolate but should not eat it” was 
also rated by them. An open-ended question to elicit their favorite brands of chocolates 
was then used with the objective of identifying subjects who consider “Ferrero Roche” 
on their favorite list. It is clear that subjects were primed by the exposure to this brand 
just before the questionnaire and it is reasonable to expect a much higher rate of 
remembrance than the real top of mind favorite before the experiment. Nevertheless, the 
objective was not to find a top of mind favorite but to evaluate if the fact that this brand 
was a favorite had an impact on choice, on consistency of choices or on response 
latency. 
Before leaving the room the participants received a short explanation on the objectives 
of the experiment and the importance of their participation. They were also given the 
opportunity to ask further questions. In the end, the participants were asked not to share 
any information about the experiment with their colleagues and to hide the chocolates in 








Outliers are response times generated by processes that are not the one(s) being studied.  
A single extremely long outlier can increase the mean, inflate the standard deviation, 
and change measures of shape such as skewness by a large degree (Wagner 2009). The 
processes that generate outliers in response latency can be fast guesses, guesses that are 
based on the subject's estimate of the typical time to respond, multiple runs of the 
process that is actually under study, the subject's inattention, or guesses based on the 
subject's failure to reach a decision (Ratcliff 1993). In these contexts and for most 
theoretical or empirical purposes, it is desirable to eliminate outliers from the data. 
However, eliminating outliers requires unambiguously identifying them. The problem is 
that the distribution of response times from the real processes under study overlaps, to a 
great extent, the distribution of outlier response times. As a result, the best we can hope 
to do is to reduce the effects of potential outliers while eliminating as little as possible 
the data of real interest. 
Luce (1991) demonstrated that genuine Response Latencies (RL) have a minimum 
value of at least 100 ms. It is the time needed for physiological processes such as 
stimulus perception and motor responses. Even the fastest response time (1320ms) did 
not get close to these values and seemed perfectly reasonable. We were not concerned 
with the existence of those fast guesses. 
Response Latencies in the middle of the distribution due to spurious processes are 
impossible to identify, because they are intermixed with genuine RL. There is nothing 
that can be done beyond tight experimental control during the task itself to attenuate the 
effects of these responses. 
 It is quite common for some RL to be slow and these RL can strongly influence the 
outcome of hypothesis tests. The aim is to lessen the impact of such outliers by using 
statistical transformations of the data that minimize their effects or by trimming them 
out of the data. 
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Transforming RL to speed (inverse RL) normalizes the distribution somewhat, reduces 
the effect of slow outliers, and therefore generally maintains good power (Ratcliff 
1993). Transforming data by using the logarithm of each RL normalizes the distribution 
more than the inverse transformation, although the effect of long RL is not attenuated to 
the same extent as the inverse, and therefore power is reduced relative to the inverse 
transformation. There are also issues of interpretation after transformation of a variable, 
because the relationship among the variables has been changed.  
Cutoffs eliminate slow RL by excluding data longer than some absolute time, some 
percentage of the data, or data that are some proportion of standard deviations above the 
mean. No universal rule can be used to establish absolute cutoffs because they are 
highly dependent on the particular data that were observed. Consequently, cutoffs are 
often based on the standard deviation (Ratcliff 1993). 
After careful consideration and histogram analysis, we decided to exclude all 
individuals that had at least in one of the two moments a RL greater than three standard 
deviations above the mean. We replayed the video recording of those extreme 
observations and they corresponded to situations where the subjects did not follow the 
instructions fully - asking questions during the timed experiment, for example – or did 
something outside the standard procedure like picking two chocolates to examine in 
detail. We felt assured that the exclusion of those observations was the right choice. 
This resulted in the elimination of 6 observations which represent 4% of the total 
sample size. 
 
4.2. Attractiveness of free 
 
When considering the first moment of the experiment, nonrandom aggregate preference 
inconsistency can be used as a measure of over or under-reaction to the free product. 
The first clear result is the support of Shampanier’s et al (2007) conclusion that a small 
difference in price has a considerable influence on demand if it represents a difference 
between a positive price and zero. In spite of the same price difference between 
chocolates in both situations, the free “Red” attracted 34.2% of the participants against 
18.9% when it was not free. We made the test for difference of means (without 
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assuming equal variance) and the results indicate that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the price setup and the choice of chocolate (t = 2.14 and two tailed 
p = 0.034). Participants reacted as if a free Red had more intrinsic value than a 
positively priced Red.  
When considering the second moment of the experiment we can evaluate behavior on 
an individual level. Subjects changed their choice of chocolate in 38.9% of the cases 
between the two moments. This gives support to previous studies that point out that 
consumers making repeated selections among a set of options are often motivated to 
choose variety (Ratner, Kahn, et al. 1999). The following chart indicates the number of 





















Figure 6 - Number of subjects that changed their choice between moments and their representativeness 
 
When the experiment started with the free/non-free combination (free condition), 36.1% 
changed their choice of chocolate for the second moment. When the experiment started 
with the non-free/non-free combination (standard condition), 38.9% changed their 
choice of chocolate for the second moment. With a t = 0.34 and a two-tailed p = 0.73, 
the results suggest that there is no statistically significant relationship between the order 
of the experiment and the propensity to change the chosen chocolate between moments. 
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This suggests that the condition’s order does not have an impact on choice consistency. 
In other words, we probably do not have more chances of persuading an individual to 
change his choice if we present the free chocolate condition in the second moment. 
Another result was that subjects seemed more willing to change their choice if they had 
chosen the Ferrero (43%) in the first moment instead of the Red (22%). The sample was 
too small to do separate conclusive tests by not assuming the irrelevance of the order of 
the conditions (t=-1.75, p=0.08 for the free condition first). Given the evidence 
presented, we decided for that assumption and consider all the 56 subjects that changed 
their choice together in one group. With a t = 2.55 and a p = 0.01, the results suggest 
that there is a statistically significant difference between the proportions. People who 
chose Ferrero changed more. One possible explanation is rooted in the fact that, unlike 
Red, Ferrero is a well known brand and the majority of the participants have tasted this 
chocolate before. In that case, and since variety seeking is often linked with the desire to 
experience new products (Kahn 1995), the wish to taste an unknown chocolate could be 
the reason behind this inconsistent behavior. People might like Ferrero but want to try 
another chocolate for variety and for a chance that they might like it even more. 
Furthermore, there is the possibility that people know they do not like Ferrero and so 
will consistently chose an unknown chocolate that they might eventually like. 
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4.3. Response Latency 
 
Response Latency (RL), the elapsed decision time, is a common dependent variable.  
Conducting an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the sample may not be effective, due 
to the particular characteristics of RL data. Importantly, these distributions are not 
normal distributions but rather rise rapidly on the left and have a long positive tail on 
the right. We can see an example in the following histogram. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Histogram of Response Latency in the standard condition (unit: cs - hundredths of seconds). 
 
Neither the mean nor the standard deviation is a robust measure. The mean is not 
reflective of the typical response if the distribution is skewed, because the mean is 
distorted in the direction of the skew. The standard deviation can be greatly increased 
by a relatively low number of slow RL. Therefore, many researchers report the median 
RL as a central tendency parameter, because it is less susceptible to departures from 
normality (i.e., robust). A difficulty with using the median is that unlike the sample 
mean, it is a biased estimator of the population median when the population is skewed: 
the true population median will, on average, be underestimated. However, this is a 
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minor problem in our experiment because we are comparing conditions with the same 
number of trials, so the bias is approximately equal across conditions.  
In the first moment of the experiment, median latencies in groups “free” and “standard” 
were 488 centiseconds (cs) and 448 cs respectively. The median subject in the free 
condition took longer then the one in the control condition. However, we ran non-
parametric tests and could not conclude that the distributions in the two groups differed 
significantly (Mann-Whitney U = 2337, Z=-1.019, p = 0.31). 
In the second moment, median latencies in groups “free” and “standard” were 381 cs 
and 503 cs respectively. The median subject in the free condition took less than the one 
in the control condition and the results were significant (Mann-Whitney U = 1960, Z=-
2.523, p = 0.01). This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that affect and lower 
mental transaction costs accounts for the over-reaction to free products. People do not 
have to answer the “Is it worth it?” question and may activate a “nothing to lose” 
heuristic sparing mental effort.  
It is important to acknowledge the strong possibility of carryover effects i.e., the second 
moment in the experiment being conditioned by the first. For instance, repeated 
measure designs are almost always affected by practice effects. Subjects can become 
faster at a task over time or, conversely, become slower through boredom and fatigue. 
This is one of the reasons why we did not compare RL between moments. 
Considering the limitations of an analysis based solely on the median, we decided to 
analyze the whole distribution, thereby discovering effects that would otherwise be 
missed. Response Latency distributions are similar to the ex-Gaussian distribution 
(Luce 1986), which is a convolution of a Gaussian and an exponential distribution that 
has been shown to fit empirical RL distributions well (e.g., Balota & Spieler, 2008; 
1999). This distribution has three parameters. The mean and the standard deviation of 
Gaussian - the left hump - are described by mu (µ) and sigma (δ), respectively. Tau (τ) 
describes both the mean and the standard deviation of the exponential component - the 





One difficulty with the ex-Gaussian function is that there is no arithmetic or other 
simple way to derive the parameters of the underlying processes from the observable 
data. To estimate the unobservable parameters, an iterative procedure is used to find the 
parameter values for which the shape of the probability function best fits the frequency 
distribution of data. DISTRIB is a MATLAB toolbox comprising the necessary 
functions to fit the ex-Gaussian Probability Distribution Function (PDF) using 
maximum likelihood estimation (Lagarias et al. 1999). Egfit is a function that 
implements a robust search algorithm to fit the ex-Gaussian PDF to a frequency 
distribution (Lacouture & Cousineau 2008).  
Since median latency analysis was inconclusive for the first moment of the experiment, 
we wanted to analyze the between-group differences using the ex-Gaussian parameters. 









Free condition  204,270 53,992 403,423 
Standard condition 219,381 55,719 312,855 
 
Figure 8 - Ex-Gaussian Parameter for the first moment of the experiment (Unit: cs - hundredths of 
seconds). 
 
The Gaussian component can be conceptualized as the transduction component, i.e., the 
sum of the time required by the sensory process and the time required to physically 
make the response (Luce, 1986). The exponential process can be seen as the decision 
component; i.e., the time required deciding which response to make. With this in mind, 
our objective of obtaining a proxy for time required to decide should be centered on this 
exponential part of the distribution.  However, we must recognize that associating 
particular cognitive processes with the ex-Gaussian parameters is not free of critics. 
Some research points out that the interpretation of ex-Gaussian parameters is 
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problematic (Matzke & Wagenmakers 2009), with no clear correspondence between the 
parameters of the ex-Gaussian function and those of a widely accepted cognitive model 
of binary choice reaction time tasks (Ratcliff & Rouder 1998; Rouder et al. 2008). As a 
result, the initial analysis in terms of ex-Gaussian parameters shown here is useful in 
that it tells us there is a difference in distribution shape that may be driven by the 
conditions of the experiment. It also matches the earlier analyses that have highlighted a 
change in median RL. Nevertheless, as with the median RL, the ex-Gaussian 
distributional characterization is simply that, a characterization. 
Ex-Gaussian parameters were individually entered into one-way ANOVAs. Neither mu 
(F(1,142) =1.715; p=0.19) nor sigma (F(1,142)=1.215; p=0.27), the normal component 
of the ex-Gaussian RL curve, was significantly different between groups. In a 
theoretical perspective, it was reasonable to expect that the distribution of the time 
required for the sensory process and the physical response would not be very different 
across conditions.  A significant difference between groups was shown on the 
exponential part of the curve, tau (F (1,142) = 4.811; p = 0.03), suggesting that the 
subject in the free condition demonstrated a more positive skew in their distribution of 
RL. This was consistent with the hypothesis that mental effort and conscious reasoning 
is superior in the particular context of this experiment. 










Free condition 222,561 640,627 208,452 
Standard condition 297,072 110,732 221,344 
 




Both mu (F(1,142)=5.225; p=0.03) and sigma (F(1,142)=8.577; p<0.01) were 
significantly different between groups. However, tau (F(1,142) = 1.841; p = 0.17) was 
not significantly different across conditions. All the parameters were greater in the 
standard condition which is consistent with what we have seen in the median analysis. 
The between-groups difference in tau suggests that the free condition increases mental 
effort and conscious reasoning. This is reasonable because an offer where people must 
evaluate if it is worth forgoing a free chocolate in favor of another chocolate with an 
attractive price is unusual. Consumers are used to offers of free goods where they only 
have to decide if they accept it or not. The evidence in these more common situations is 
for short response latency associated with automatic cognitive process and heuristics. 
In the second moment we have the opposite result. After being exposed to the standard 
condition in the first moment, people are noticeably faster when a free chocolate is 
present. Considering that the first moment helped subjects become more comfortable 
with the task, it is reasonable to think that the salient features of the second moment – a 
free product – more easily activated an automatic process or heuristic.  
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that the use of implicit measures such as response 
latency has some limitations in itself. For example, the fact that a particular construct is 
assessed via an implicit measure does not necessarily imply that the construct is an 
implicit or nonconscious one. It may simply suggest that motivational influences that 
occur downstream from attitude elicitation play a key role (Fazio & Towles-Schwen 
1999). At the same time, different implicit measures of the same construct sometimes 
do not correlate very highly leading some researchers to question their validity (Fazio & 




The questionnaire (appendix) combines diverse information on self-reported 
preferences related to the experiment. A possible correlation with the variables collected 
from the actual experiment – choice, inconsistency, response latency, etc. – can give 
more clues to better understand the subject of the study and even uncover some 
potential effect one might have missed. Subjects were asked to rate on a Likert scale 
their liking for chocolate and for bonbons. If the subjects responded positively, the 
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perceived applicability of the affirmation “I like chocolate but should not eat it” was 
also rated by them. An open-ended question to elicit their favorite brands of chocolates 
was used with the objective of identifying subjects who include “Ferrero Roche” on 
their favorites. 
The correct use of the coefficient of correlation depends heavily on the assumptions 
made with respect to the nature of the data. The distributions of both variables related 
by the coefficient of correlation should be normal and the scatter-plots should be linear 
and homoscedastic. In situations like this one where those assumptions are violated, 
Pearson correlations coefficients become inadequate to explain a given relationship 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero 2005). In this situation, it is better to use 
nonparametric correlations. 
A rank-order correlation coefficient that makes no assumptions about the distribution of 
the actual values is Kendall’s Tau-b. Kendall’s Tau-b like other closely related rank-
order correlation coefficients (e.g., Goodman’s and Kruskal’s Gamma) are calculated as 
a ratio. In the numerator is a ratio which denotes the difference between the number of 
all “concordant” and “discordant” pairs (Frankfort-Nachmias & Leon-Guerrero 2005). 
The following table shows Kendall's tau-b correlation coefficients between the variables 





Likes Chocolate Likes Bonbons
"I like chocolate 




,058 ,041 ,053 ,326
,621 ,725 ,627 ,008
,094 ,076 ,057 -,027
,256 ,355 ,458 ,748
,001 -,008 -,030 ,018





Figure 10 - Correlation coefficient table with Kendall's tau-b (bold) and corresponding p-value 
 
In terms of actual choice, the results were not significantly correlated with the subject’s 
rating of their general liking of chocolate (K tau-b=0.058; p=0.62) and of bonbons (K 
tau-b=0.041; p=0.73). The same is true for the perceived applicability of the affirmation 
“I like chocolate but should not eat it” (K tau-b=0.053; p=0.63). Unsurprisingly, the 
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choice of chocolates is correlated with fact that the subject indicated “Ferrero Roche” as 
one of his favorite brands. 
In terms of consistency and response latency, the correlations were not significant with 
the reported preferences. The fact that favorite brand does not correlate with choice 
inconsistency gives further support to the explanation for the observed behavior that 
people who chose Ferrero first, changed more. People might like Ferrero but want to try 
another chocolate for variety. A favorite brand does not imply consistency in these 
sequential experiments. 




One possible limitation of this experiment is the fact that the experimental conditions 
were restricted to low priced products. It is reasonable to question whether the effects 
occur when the decisions involve larger sums of money. Shampanier et al (2007) ran a 
survey with a similar design, but regarding the purchase of an LCD flat-panel television. 
The four conditions varied in terms of prices, such that a Sharp LCD was always $599 
more expensive than a Philips LCD, and the prices of both sets decreased by 
approximately $100 across conditions. The conditions were 299 vs. 898, 199 vs. 798, 99 
vs. 698, and 0 vs. 598. Results generally resembled their previous findings. A shift in 
demand is apparent only when the price is reduced to zero. Otherwise, the effects of 
price reductions do not have a significant influence on the relative demand for the two 
televisions. Despite being self-reported preferences from a survey prone to hypothetical 
bias (unlike revealed preferences in our experiment), their results suggest that the effect 










Shampanier et al (2007) showed that when faced with a choice between two products, 
one of which is free, people overreact to the free product. People behave as if zero 
prices meant not only a low cost of buying the product, but also its increased valuation. 
Our experiment supports this conclusion, showing that a small difference in price has a 
substantial and disproportionate influence on demand if it represents a difference 
between a small positive price and zero. 
In comparison with the abovementioned paper, our experiment had additional features 
including a sequential selection from each condition, measuring response latency and a 
questionnaire. 
In the sequential experiment, subjects often changed their choice of chocolate between 
the two moments. This gives support to previous studies that point out that consumers 
making repeated selections are often motivated to choose variety. There was no 
evidence of a relationship between the order of the experiment and the inconsistency in 
the choice of chocolates between moments. 
The evidence from the response latency analysis was mixed and did not lead to a clear 
conclusion. We should keep in mind two potential opposite effects that might tend to 
cancel each other out. On one hand, affect (and associated automatic processes) can 
contribute to faster times. On the other, the peculiar nature of this free condition and the 
perceived difficulty of the task might obstruct the alternative shortcut of heuristics and 
encourage a more conscious and slower response. The results depend on the stronger 
effect. We found that the first and the second moment of the experiment had opposing 
results. In the first moment, people were slower when a free chocolate was present 
suggesting that the unusual question effect was stronger then a potentially triggered 
heuristic effect. After being exposed to the standard condition in the first moment, 
people were noticeably faster in the free condition. Considering that the first moment 
helped subjects become more comfortable with the task, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the salient features of the second moment – a free product – might have activated an 
automatic process that increased the speed of response. 
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The questionnaire combined diverse information on self-reported preferences. A 
possible correlation with the variables collected from the actual experiment could bring 
significant information to the subject. Overall, the correlations were not significant with 
the reported preferences. The fact that favorite brand does not correlate with choice 
inconsistency gives support to the proposed reason why people who chose Ferrero first, 
changed more. Unlike Red, Ferrero is a well known brand and the majority of the 
participants have tasted before. The desire to taste a new chocolate may be the reason 
behind this inconsistent behavior. People might like Ferrero but want to try another 
chocolate for variety and for a chance that they might like it even more. A favorite 
brand does not imply consistency in these sequential experiments.   
This study adds additional evidence to previous findings that show that free is a unique 
price. Although our results are consistent with the view that the zero-price effect may be 
explained by affect, the price of zero remains a complex and rich domain, and all the 
forces described may come into play in different situations. Therefore, considerable 
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Sobre Chocolate: Não gosto nada Não gosto
Nem gosto, nem 
desgosto
Gosto Gosto muito
1 2 3 4 5
Gosta de chocolate? □ □ □ □ □
Gosta de bombons de chocolate? □ □ □ □ □
Se respondeu que gosta ou que gosta muito de chocolate:





1 2 3 4 5
Eu gosto de chocolate mas não devo comer. □ □ □ □ □
Quais as suas marcas preferidas de chocolate?






1 2 3 4 5
É divertido comprar de forma espontânea. □ □ □ □ □
Eu não compro até ter a certeza que é uma verdadeira pechincha. □ □ □ □ □
Eu evito comprar coisas que não estão na minha lista de compras. □ □ □ □ □
O tempo que demoro para encontrar preços mais baixos normalmente não vale o esforço. □ □ □ □ □
Eu nunca compraria em mais do que uma loja para encontrar preços mais baixos. □ □ □ □ □
Para mim, comprar alimentos é uma ocorrência espontânea. □ □ □ □ □
Mesmo quando vejo algo de que realmente gosto, eu não compro a menos que seja uma 
compra planeada. □ □ □ □ □
Interessa-me bastante preços baixos mas também me interessa a qualidade do produto. □ □ □ □ □
O dinheiro poupado por encontrar preços mais baixos não vale o tempo e esforço. □ □ □ □ □
Não quero correr riscos desnecessários. □ □ □ □ □
Quando estou a comprar alimentos comparo os preços de diferentes marcas para ter a 
certeza que obtenho o máximo pelo dinheiro gasto. □ □ □ □ □
No que diz respeito à compra de alimentos, geralmente compro por impulso. □ □ □ □ □
Quando estou a comprar um produto, tento sempre maximizar a qualidade que obtenho pelo 
dinheiro que gasto. □ □ □ □ □
Eu não gosto de correr riscos. □ □ □ □ □
Em termos gerais, considero-me um comprador impulsivo. □ □ □ □ □
Normalmente, quando estou a comprar alimentos, comparo o preço por kg das marcas que 
normalmente compro. □ □ □ □ □
Eu compro alimentos em mais de uma loja para aproveitar preços mais baixos. □ □ □ □ □
Para mim, comprar alimentos pode ser algo inesperado. □ □ □ □ □
Quando vou às compras, eu compro coisas que não tinha a intenção de comprar. □ □ □ □ □
Eu verifico sempre os preços para ter sempre a certeza que obtenho o máximo pelo dinheiro 
gasto. □ □ □ □ □
Comparando com outras pessoas, eu gosto de arriscar. □ □ □ □ □
Eu não estou disposto a fazer um esforço extra para encontrar preços mais baixos. □ □ □ □ □
Comparando com outras pessoas, eu gosto de "viver a vida no limite". □ □ □ □ □
         Questionário sobre comportamento do consumidor           
Solicitamos a sua colaboração no preenchimento deste questionário sobre o seu comportamento quando está a fazer compras. Não existem respostas
certas ou erradas. Pedimos que seja preciso(a) e sincero(a). A colaboração é voluntária e anónima, pelo que pedimos que não se identifique em qualquer
parte do questionário.
Obrigado pela sua colaboração.
Sexo:     Masculino  □     Feminino  □            Idade: ____
 
